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Securities Law Reform and the ALI Federal
Securities Code
HOMER KRIPKE*

Professor Kripke was one of Professor Loss' consultants for
the Federal Securities Code project. In this article, Professor
Kripke expresses both his overall support for the enactment of
the proposed Code and his reservations regarding some of the
policies underlying the codification efforts.
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INTRODUCTION

The Federal Securities Code,' drafted under the sponsorship of

the American Law Institute (ALI), has been completed. I think that
it should be enacted.
Discussion can best be divided into consideration of the execution and the planning of the document, and the execution can only

be described as superb. Drafting the Code was a tremendous task
and was primarily the work of one man, Professor Louis Loss. I
would be remiss not to acknowledge Professor Loss' dedicated effort
in perfecting his conception. I joined freely in the applause which
the ALI accorded him in May of 1978, both on the day the Proposed
Official Draft was adopted and later that evening at the Institute's
.annual dinner. The drafting process was a labor of love. Those of
us who followed it closely were amazed and awed at the extent to
which Professor Loss studied such diverse matters as the proposed
criminal code, pending bankruptcy bills, international banking legislation, and the terminology of the ALI's Restatements of the Law,
in order to integrate these areas with applicable Code sections. He
.conferred not only with his own consultants, advisors and the American Bar Association Committee on Federal Regulation of Securi* Chester Rohrlich Professor of Law, New York University. A.B., J.D., University of
Michigan. Professor Kripke was a Consultant to the American Law Institute's Federal Securities Code Project.
1. ALl FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE (Mar. 1978 Proposed Official Draft) (hereinafter FED.
SEC. CODE].
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ties, but also with investment company representatives, state securities administrators, spokesmen for the SEC and the securities industry, and the chairmen and staffs of key congressional committees. The work represents a tour de force and the encomia given its
author are well-deserved.
Aspects of the planning and conception of the Code, on the
other hand, led to problems which can be perceived in the final
product. The apparent confusion and lack of consensus concerning
the proper objectives of the codification program have been identified as the critical flaws in the conception of the Code.' I was one of
Professor Loss' inner circle of consultants, but because ALI Director
Herbert Wechsler would not permit me to join the project until I had
completed my own work as Associate Reporter on the Review Committee for Article Nine of the Uniform Commercial Code, the key
concepts of this massive task were determined before I came
aboard.3 As I learned, attempts to reopen conceptual discussions
2. A speaker at the initial Conference on the Codification of the Federal Securities Laws
recently reflected on the symposium at which the recommendation to undertake a revision
of the federal securities laws was made.
Rereading the transcript of the proceedings was a pleasantly nostalgic reminder
of the deep intellectual stimulation and challenge one experienced when sitting
through those sessions. It also brought back some of the confusion evident in
discussing the proper objectives of a codification program-a subject upon which
the participants never seemed to establish a complete harmony. On the one hand,
mere rewriting of the law and straightening out of confusions would not have been
worth the effort. Conversely, codification could not attempt a thorough-going
revision and rethinking of all problems in the securities laws, since that would
have been an impossible task, tinged with political dispute and destined for
conflict, and probably, failure.
Bialkin, Issuer Registrationand the Distribution Provisions of the Proposed FederalSecurities Code, 30 VAND. L. REv. 327, 328 (1977) (footnotes omitted). Those who recommended the
initiation of the project demonstrated a sense of urgency to get a project underway, even in
the absence of established goals. During the panel discussion following the seminal enclave,
many enthusiastic statements were made which revealed the pervasive sense of urgency in
those early sessions:
Mr. Chairman, we have had a lot of ideas this morning and received future topics
to be discussed. Perhaps I have missed something in the literature that preceded
this program, but assuming I haven't, I would like to see something that is a result
of this conference. I would like to see how we can make a recommendation to the
Institute, for example, or to the ABA-a program that they can take up and
follow, suggest names such as the names who are here today. I would like us to
see something get moving. These various philosophies and what should be studied
are all very interesting and very important, but let's have a vehicle we can put
them in and get moving.
Sterling, General Discussion, 22 Bus. LAW. 803, 808 (1967).
3. See note 2 supra. The Code was finally drafted by using a legal and codification
approach. In my view, the key question at the outset was whether to rethink the objectives
of present securities laws in light of what is now known about the market or whether simply
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were ruled out of order. Although one must defer to majority judgments, I have been unable to overcome some concerns about them,
despite my constant efforts as a consultant to give Professor Loss
full support on the technical redrafting. Indeed, I have a two-inch
thick file of correspondence with him concerning drafting points
which I raised privately in order to avoid taking the time of other
consultants and advisors during their meetings with him.
Regardless of these misgivings, I believe the Code will be very
useful in pulling together the securities laws as they now exist. The
second section of this article describes the advantages procured by
the Code by integration of the 1933,1 19341 and 19391 Acts. The
problems resulting from the vagueness and uncertainty as to the
purpose and philosophy of the drafting project are analyzed in Sections III, IV, and V.

II. THE KEY ADVANTAGE: INTEGRATION OF THE 1933, 1934 AND 1939
ACTS

In my opinion, the key advantage of the Code, and one which
warrants its adoption, is the integration 7 of the 1933, 1934, and 1939
Acts and the corresponding rationalization of the liability provisions
of each Act.
The Code was never intended to be merely a restatement of
existing law. On the contrary, the drafters intended to implement
Milton H. Cohen's perception that the securities disclosure laws
should be consolidated to avoid duplication of discussion.' This
could be accomplished by requiring registration of companies instead of security issues.' It is recognized that while the Code was
to revise and integrate existing legislation by drafting provisions which would be compatible
with the existing administrative framework. Reliance on the former approach would have
required input not only from lawyers but also from economists and financiers who have
learned a great deal about the securities markets over the last forty-five years, and who have
very strong views about the relationship between the legal securities system and market
economics. On the other hand, it is probably true that if Professor Loss and those who
planned the project with him had elected to take this route, they might not have found the
support which they have garnered by adopting a purely legal and codification approach.
4. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976) [hereinafter cited as the 1933
Act].
5. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b-77e, 77j, 77k, 77m, 77o, 77s, 78a78o, 78o-3, 78p-78hh (1976) [hereinafter cited as the 1934 Act].
6. Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-77bbbb (1976) [hereinafter cited as
the 1939 Act].
7. For a related discussion of how the Code integrates the disclosure requirements of the
1933 and 1934 Acts, see Wolfson, Comments on the ProposedFederalSecurities Code: Transformation of the Securities Act of 1933, 33 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1495 (1979).
8. Cohen, Truth in Securities Revisited, 79 HARv. L. REV. 1340 (1966).
9. See id. at 1378-80 & n.110. Mr. Cohen's ideas were acknowledged by Professor Loss
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being written and delayed by the extended codification efforts, the
SEC, under existing statutes, made some successful attempts at
implementing Cohen's idea through rulemaking and administrative
changes. 0 Thus, Carl Schneider's initial argument that much of the
benefit of a massive effort to draft a code could be achieved by
administrative action was seemingly justified."
Administrative rulemaking, however, could not substantially
affect the express liability provisions of the statutes. If the SEC had
so desired, it could have controlled the cancerous growth of liability
under rule 10b-5. 2 When the drafting process began in 1969, rule
10b-5 was a nightmare, and its relationship with the express liability provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts 3 was a second nightmare.
Professor Loss had rightly intimated that it was disgraceful that so
extensive a jurisprudence rested on so slender a base."
The drafters' early grasp of the nettle and efforts to eliminate
the confusion, under the leadership of one of the most noted scholars
in the field, were, therefore, both indispensable and praiseworthy.
In my view, the fresh approaches adopted by the Code will improve
the system. For example, the Code provides for a compulsory class
action suit to define and limit liability in cases of impersonal misreat the ABA Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities Laws in 1966. Professor Loss
commented that the answer to the problems raised by integration could be resolved by a
system of permanent registration of some sort (I am talking very roughly) whereby
perhaps, instead of registering securities, we would register companies. That is
to say, any company would have to register when it went public for the first time,
or when it met something like the present 12(g) standards or when it wanted to
list or when it wanted to be an investment company. And then on certain contingencies, like a stock offering or an exchange listing or a reclassification, there
would be something I would generically call a report. Some of these reports might
be prospectuses, but the prospectus would not be central, nor would a public
offering of securities be central, to this scheme as I envisage it.
Loss, History of SEC Legislative Programs and Suggestions for a Code, 22 Bus. LAW. 795,
796 (1967).
10. The principal vehicle for this was the S-16 form, which reduced registration under
the 1933 Act to a formality for certain issuers which report continuously to the SEC. The form
was adopted in 1970; it requires that a registrant's annual reports, proxy or information
statements, and applicable current and periodic reports be incorporated by reference. See
SEC Release No. 33-5117, [1970-71 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 77,941, at
80,094 (Dec. 23, 1970).
11. Schneider, Reform of the Federal Securities Laws, 115 PA. L. REv. 1023, 1023-25
(1967); see also Schneider, An Administrative Programfor Reforming the Federal Securities
Laws, 23 Bus. LAW. 737, 738-40 (1968).
12. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1978).
13. E.g., 1933 Act §§ 77k, 771; 1934 Act §§ 78p, 78r.
14. Professor Loss commented: "What has happened to Rule lOb-5 ... always reminds
me of a cartoon of the time showing Mussolini dictating to his secretary, and the caption was,
'Miss Baccigalupi, take a law.'" Loss, supra note 9, at 796.
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presentations affecting the market. 5 This seems to be as good a
device as any, and no better suggestion has been forthcoming."
Another way in which the Code should improve the system is
by its restatement of the 1933 Act transaction exemptions. The
concept of a "limited offering" in Code section 242(b), which replaces the present "non-public" or "private offering" terminology,
is simpler and far more appropriate, given today's revolt against
overregulation, than the exemption provisions of rule 146,'" which I
have labeled a "major blunder."' 8 Similarly, the Code goes far to
simplify and rationalize the intrastate exemption, which is currently governed by the unjustifiably restrictive rule 147,'1 promulgated under section 3(a)(11) of the Securities Act of 1933.1 Additionally, for secondary distributors who own not more than fifteen
percent of the registrant's voting securities, the section 512(d) exemption for secondary distributions balances convenience with the
need for disclosure in secondary transactions more judiciously than
do the Commission's current attitudes2' embodied in rules 144, '2
15. FED. SEC. CODE § 1711.
16. The drafting in the area of liability, however, can be faulted. Dean David Ruder, a
leading expert on liability under the securities acts, pointed out in the discussions that a key
issue is whether the standard of reasonable belief implies a reasonable investigation. Professor Loss did follow § 11(a) of the 1933 Act in Code § 1704 by requiring a reasonable investigation in a registration situation; yet, in the long list of other situations requiring reasonable
belief which he has usefully compiled in his notes to § 287, he repeatedly leaves open the
question. See FED. SEC. CODE at 108-11. This invites litigation which would perhaps have been
obviated by more specific drafting.
17. 17 C.F.R. § 240.146 (1978).
18. Kripke, SEC Rule 146: A "Major Blunder", N.Y.L.J., July 5, 1974, at 1, col. 3.
19. 17 C.F.R. § 240.147 (1978).
20. 1933 Act § 77c(a)(11).
21. For example, rule 144 provides strict volume limitations on secondary transactions
involving securities held by affiliates of the issuer. Similarly, those who acquire securities in
private offerings are restricted in their resale possibilities by various conditions of the rule.
These provisions evince a clear intent to restrict the resale of securities, especially on the part
of control persons. This "restricted distribution" concept is based, at least in part, on the
SEC-perceived need to control the trading market and to prevent any high volume trading
which might disrupt the market and cause violent price flunctuations. Significantly, the Code
attempts to protect the block traders by providing an exemption for those selling not more
than fifteen percent of the registrant's securities. The pertinent section is as follows:
Sec. 512. [Exemptions.] Sections 502 to 504 inclusive do not apply with respect
to transactions in an exempted security or the following transactions:
(d) [Secondary distributions.] a transaction incident to an offering of securities of a one-year registrant by a secondary distributor who owns (or, in good
faith reliance on a statement by the registrant or its transfer agent, believes that
he owns) not more than 15 percent of the voting securities of the registrant; but,
if he acquired any securities of the same class in a limited offering (not otherwise
exempted) during the one-year period specified in section 242(b), this exemption
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145,3 and 147.4
Another very valuable change is the revision of the concepts of
the Trust Indenture Act. 5 Under the Code, the requisite contractual
relationships and duties, currently imposed as a condition to licensing the sale of affected securities, will become status relationships imposed by federal law. Unfortunately, the repeated use of
these contractual provisions in trust indentures over the past forty
years has served no purpose other than providing employment for
lawyers and printers."5

III.

EXERCISE OF FLEXIBILITY TO MAKE CHANGES

Apart from the three main points of change discussed in Part
I-integration of the disclosure statutes, rethinking of the liability
provisions and rationalization of the transaction exemptions-the
Code operates on the basis suggested in Part IV, as a restatement

of the law but with a modest amount of flexibility to make changes.
At this point, I would like to comment on the draftsmen's exercise
or non-exercise of the flexibility to make changes.
The Code preserves certain rules of law which were considered
by some persons, including myself, to be seriously debatable as a

matter of policy, but which were also deemed to be sacred cows in
applies only to securities of the class in excess of those he so acquired.
Because of the "restricted distribution" attitude reflected in the current rules, the Commission is likely to take a hard look at this section.
22. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (1978).
23. Id. § 230.145.
24. Id. § 230.147.
25. The 1939 Act.
26. Instead of requiring the mandatory verbiage relating to the duties of the trustee to
be repeated in every indenture (and in order to save young lawyers, as I once was, from the
burden of going down to the printers at 2:00 in the morning and reading proofs), the Code
provides that every indenture shall be deemed to contain these provisions; thus, it becomes
unnecessary to state them. The advantages of economy and simplicity are so obvious that
one wonders why he did not think of it himself.
Section 1305 of the Code provides in part:
Sec. 1305. [Relation of Code to indenture.] (a) ["Statutory" and "optional"
provisions.] Sections 1306 to 1315 inclusive are a part of, and govern, every
qualified indenture, whether or not they are physically contained therein, except
that the provisions therein that are prefaced by the phrase, "unless the indenture
provides otherwise," are not a part of such an indenture to the extent that they
are specifically modified or excluded. The provisions so prefaced are herein
termed the "optional provisions," and the other provions of sections 1306 to 1315
inclusive are herein termed the "statutory provisions."
(b) [Additional provisions.] Such an indenture may contain any other provision that is not inconsistent with the statutory provisions; but the statutory
provisions govern over any provision that limits, qualifies, or conflicts with them.
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the minds of either the SEC or the congressional committees and
were, therefore, not changed. For instance, there is the question of
the issuer's liability in a registration statement under section 11 of
the Securities Act of 1933.27 Neither proof of good faith nor lack of
negligence frees the issuer from liability if there is a material misstatement or omission. There is absolute liability, subject only to
the defense of truth. It is strange that the American law comes down
so hard on the issuer, because the British Companies Act of 1929,25
from which section 11 of the 1933 Act is largely copied, takes the
opposite position. Under the Companies Act, liability does not attach to the issuer as an entity, but attaches to the individuals who
may be responsible, the officers, directors, underwriters and experts
involved. 2 To my mind, the British approach is clearly superior
because when an issuer is in trouble, the corporate structure becomes a "diaphanous veil"30 through which one can see live men and
women, stockholders and creditors. One can see that the real interests involved are those of the individual security holders, present
and future, and not those of the artificial corporate entity.
Imposing liability on an issuer, as an entity, for the material
misstatement or omission attributable to individuals in positions of
responsibility within the corporation-many of whom are also security holders-results in spreading the cost of wrongdoing proportionately among all security holders, both innocent and culpable. It is
not always sufficient to answer that the stockholders who suffer
from a judgment against the issuer obtained the benefit of the cash
the issuer received upon the sale of securities. This may be true
sometimes; but on other occasions, issuers register on behalf of other
persons for a secondary offering in which the issuer receives nothing.
In any event, due to the constant shifts in ownership of America's
public corporations, the stockholders who suffer from the judgment
might have been newcomers who never received any of the benefit
which the corporation obtained from the offering.
For these reasons, in the recent Bankruptcy Act of 1978,' Congress has ensured that stockholders or subordinated creditors will
not be able to lift themselves in the corporate hierarchy by suing the
issuer for rescission or for damages, on the grounds of either violat27. 1934 Act § 77k.
28. Companies Act, 1929, 19 & 20 Geo. 5, c. 23, § 37.
29. Id.
30. 2 G. HORNSTEIN, CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE 262 (1959), quoted in Cote Bros.,
Inc. v. Granite Lake Realty Corp., 193 A.2d 884, 886 (N.H. 1963):
31. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978), see note 71 infra.
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ing the registration requirements or of fraud."2 This legislation indicates congressional recognition of the soundness of the British position: Behind the corporation are individuals who would be capriciously affected by a statute treating their corporation as morally
responsible. Consistent with its support of section 11 of the Securities Act, the SEC opposed this sound position."3 I did my best to get
this rule changed when section 11 was codified in section 1704 of the
Code, but I was unsuccessful. Professor Loss' reasons for rejecting
it showed that he, too, recognized the soundness of the British position, but that he was unwilling to consider seriously its adoption in
the Code because he felt that neither the SEC nor Congress would
accept the change.3
A similar example relates to section 16(b) of the 1934 Act, :"
codified in section 1714 of the Code. I proposed that section 16(b)
simply be eliminated in the codification because it was a hamhanded, rough-and-ready effort to reach the problem of insider trading. For that purpose, section 16(b) is an unsatisfactory solution
because it reaches any trading by insiders, i.e., any purchase followed by a sale or a sale followed by a purchase within six months,
regardless of whether, in fact, inside information was used. :"' Conversely, the insiders may have used the inside information when
they positioned themselves; yet, they can avoid liability under section 16(b) simply by deferring the second half of the cycle until more
than six months elapse. Thus, it is seldom, if ever, that one reads
a case involving section 16(b) liability and is tempted to say, "That
32. Id. § 510(b).
33. Prior to enactment of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, the SEC position was rejected in
the only recent case to decide the issue squarely. In re Sterling Homex Corp., 579 F.2d 206
(1979). In that case, the claims of allegedly defrauded stockholders of a debtor corporation
were subordinated to claims filed by that corporation's ordinary unsecured creditors. In
support of its view, the court cited Slain & Kripke, The Interface Between Securities Regulation and Bankruptcy-Allocating the Risk of Illegal Securities Issuance Between Securityholders and the Issuer's Creditors, 48 N.Y.U. L. Rzv. 261 (1973).
34. See ALI FEDERAL SECURTES CODE § 1602, Comment 1 at 132-33 (Tent. Draft No. 3,
1974).
35. 1934 Act § 7 8p.
36. See, e.g., Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Gulf & W. Indus., Inc., 527 F.2d 335 (7th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1078 (1976) (proof of actual access to inside information, or
improper use of such information, unnecessary in a §16(b) action). But cf. Gold v. Sloan,
486 F.2d 340 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974) (exonerating officers and
directors upon finding no actual knowledge of inside information).
37. See, e.g., Colonial Realty Corp. v. MacWilliams, 512 F.2d 1187 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 867 (1975) (sale of stock by one officer on December 20 and purchase the
following June 19, and sale by another officer on December 22 and purchase the following
June 21, did not constitute short swing trading within a period of less than six months); Rosen
v. Drisler, 421 F. Supp. 1282 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
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fellow got what was coming to him. His conduct was unethical and
outrageous.

'3

The proper cases for its application never happen; it

is only hardship cases of ignorance or mistakes of law that happen.
Moreover, its crude, rule-of-thumb device is unneeded in light of the
subsequent, far more subtle and appropriate concepts of insider
trading developed under rule 10b-5 as codified in section 1603 of the
Code.

31

At any rate, I proposed more than once that section 16(b) be
eliminated from the Code and was summarily shot down each time.
It was repeatedly explained to me that Congress is very fond of
section 16(b), which it perceives as the symbolic deterrent, preventing the evil of insider trading and keeping the securities markets
fair. Professor Loss' comments on the section reflect acceptance of
this notiol,, rather than a consideration of the merits
COMMENT: (1) The initial question is whether §16(b) should
be preserved at all. Some favor its repeal on several grounds: (a)
that it is needlessly arbitrary to the point of being quixotic; (b)
that it has acted as a trap for the unwary;

. .

.(d) that, most of

all, the jurisprudence that has developed under Rule 10b-5 has
rendered obsolete the concept of automatic recapture of certain
short-term profits of certain insiders.
(2) It is the Reporter's view, however, that §16(b) has a
symbolic significance that must be, and deserves to be, recognized. 0
I am unable to detect the symbolic significance of section 16(b),
except that it does represent the acme of the zealotry with which
certain punitive portions of the securities legislation have been
praised. Its retention, even though codification provided an opportunity to sweep it away, is an adaptation of Shakespeare's insight:
"The evil that men do lives after them .... 1941
Notwithstanding the rejection of my efforts to achieve change
in the law in these respects, the points I have made do not affect
my support for the Code; the results are consistent with the concept
of codification, and the retention of these existing rules leaves the
38. Of course, no one could know how many cases are prevented from arising simply

because of the existence of § 16(b), but the insider trading inhibitions of rule 10b-5 are less
easily avoided and are equally effective for that purpose.
39. This is particularly true since rule lOb-5 does not depend upon the timing of the cycle
of purchase and sale, but depends instead upon the actual use of inside information at either
end of the transaction.
40. ALl FEDERAL SECURIITES CODE § 1413, Comments 1 & 2 at 133 (Tent. Draft No. 2,
1973).
41. W. SHAKESPEARE, JULIUS CAESAR 3.2.76 (Cambridge, 1949)(First Folio, 1623).
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law substantively no worse off than it is now. When the Code goes
beyond codification,42 however, and makes a bad rule-like section
16(b)-worse by breaking down a limitation by the Supreme
Court, 3 my protest is somewhat sharper. The issue of principle is
important, but the point involved, the purchase and sale by one who
does not acquire status as a ten-percent stockholder until after the
purchase, or who loses his status after a sale, is not important
enough to cause me to refuse to support the Code.
On another point, however, the Code adopted by the ALl in
May of 1978 would depart from present law-in my mind, very
much for the worse-by imposing strenuous liability provisions on
the issuer for material misstatements in the annual reports." Fortunately, Professor Loss recently announced that he has recommended to the ALI that it take no position on the question of the
standard of strict liability for such misstatements. He suggested
that the membership leave that question open for Congress to decide. 5 Indeed, the ALI Council has already voted in favor of his
recommendation .46

Nevertheless, the point is worthy of discussion even though,
with ALI action completed and congressional action not yet begun,
it is moot for the time being. The proposition is too basic and too
important to accept as a part of the overall "chancering process" on
the theory "that what has been produced represents no single person's preferences."' 7 In this area, the Code as drafted would violate
President Roosevelt's injunction, with which securities legislation
began, that there should be "the least possible interference with
'
honest business. 2 8
4

The Securities Act of 1933 was passed both as a response to the
Great Depression and as a response to the feeling that something
had to be done to restore confidence in the securities market. The
42. See ALl FEDERAL SECURMES CODE § 1413, Comment 6(b) at 134 (Tent. Draft No. 2,
1973).
43. Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418 (1972) (no liability imposed
on stockholder for sale within a period of less than six months after prior sale resulting in
loss of § 16 insider status),
44. See FED. SEC. CODE § 1704.
45. Loss, Keynote Address: The FederalSecurities Code, 33 U. MIAMI L. Rav. 1431, 1447
(1979). Professor Loss stated that his recommendation has "largely defused the problem."

Id.
46. Id. The American Law Institute adopted the recommendation at its May, 1979
meeting.
47. Loss, FED. SEC. CODE, Introduction at xxii.
48. Id. at xv (quoting S. REP. No. 47 at 607 and H. R. REP. No. 85 at 1-2, 73d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1933)).
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stringent liability provisions of section 11 of that Act" reach only
misstatements or omissions in registration statements for newly
distributed securities. The liability provisions are onerous; plaintiffs
need not even carry the burden of proving causation or reliance on
the alleged misleading statement or omission. 0
Section 1704 of the Code would extend the scope of the 1933 Act
liability provisions to cover the regular annual reports of the issuer."
The provisions would apply even if the issuer had received no consideration from, and had had no privity of contract with, the person
who purchased or sold securities while the annual report was outstanding and current. The same burden of due diligence, heretofore
accepted by the financial community only in connection with Securities Act registration statements, would be imposed on the writing

of annual reports.52
Securities Act registration statements are required when securities are distributed for consideration. The attendant burden of satisfying the standard of due diligence is, therefore, episodic. If that
heavy burden were imposed on routine annual reports, then issuers
would be forced to institute, on a regular basis, all of the extraordinary procedures for care, investigation and detailed description of
corporate activity previously required only occasionally. While this
requirement would enrich the legal profession, since attorneys
49. 1933 Act § 77k.
50. Recovery may be conditioned on reliance, but only if the plaintiff acquired the
security after the issuer had made generally available to its securityholders an earnings
statement covering a period of at least 12 months subsequent to the effective date of registration. The issuer's top three officers and its directors and underwriters are among those who
are liable (except for situations in which they have relied on experts) unless they carry the
burden of proving due diligence and reasonable investigation. Plaintiffs need not prove scienter. See id. But see FED. SEC. CODE § 1704(d)-(f) (defenses available).
A motion made at the May 1978 ALI meeting which would have shifted all liability for
misstatements in annual reports from § 1704 to § 1705 barely failed. Section 1705 requires a
plaintiff to prove scienter.
Besides imposing liability on the issuer, § 1704 imposes liability on all parties who are
not experts, with the usual differentiation in burdens of proof for experts and persons relying
on experts. At the May meeting, the Institute recognized that this kind of liability would be
counterproductive to the current efforts to include independent directors on corporate boards,
and the Institute took no position on its applicability to them. Since this left inside directors,
accountants and other experts subject to "section 11 liability" for annual reports, protests
continued until a substantial majority agreed to a suggestion shifting the liability of outside
directors to § 1705 "if Congress is so minded, without the Institute's recommending whether
or not that should be done." FED. SEC. CODE §§ 1704(b)(3) & note 1, 1705.
51. The Code successor to the current annual report on Form 10K would be specifically
included. FED. SEC. CODE § 1704(a); see id. § 602(a). The annual report to stockholders would
also be included if it were filed with the Commission or incorporated by reference in any
annual filing. Id. § 1704(a).
52. Id. § 1704(f).
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would be bound to give the same attention to annual reports now
required for registration statements, the result would be repugnant
to concerns currently being expressed regarding overregulation and
the unfortunate, ubiquitous necessity for securities lawyers.
Is there a sound basis for this proposed extension of section 11
liability to routine annual reports? The argument was made that the
annual report is no longer intended to be "routine." In 1933, the
registration statement was conceived as the only disclosure document. Since the primary method of disclosure has been altered from
the occasional registration statement to permanent registration coupled with the annual report, it was asserted that both documents
should therefore be subject to the same stringent liability provisions.
In my opinion, just because disclosure has become continuous
under the Code, it does not necessarily follow that the cataclysmic
liability provisions of section 11 are appropriate for the annual report. I do not mean to denigrate the importance of the integrated
reporting system, but by subjecting businesses to this continuous
liability, that system would unnecessarily intrude into corporate
affairs.
Consider, for instance, how much litigation would be fomented
by this provision if it survives. Every time a security price went up
or down, unhappy stockholders, or former stockholders, would have
an opportunity to try to shift their perceived losses to the parties
liable under this section. These potential plaintiffs, having found a
material misstatement or omission in the company's current annual
report, would not need to prove that they had been aware of the
misstated information, or that they had relied on it, or that it had
caused them damages." Rather, the burden of disproving those elements would be on the defendants.54 Entrepreneurial lawyers who
found such plaintiffs for class suits would have a field day, and the
ensuing litigation would be interminable.
The situation would be far worse than it was under rule 10b5,55 even before the Supreme Court required scienter, " because mere
negligence would suffice to impose liability under the proposed provisions. 7 Furthermore, proof of damage would not be required in
53. Id. § 1704(c).
54. Id. § 1704(d)-(g).

55. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1978).
56. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 206-11 (1976).
57. The standard of care under § 1704 is the reasonableness that is "required of'a prudent
man under the circumstances in the conduct of his own affairs .
FED. SEC. CODE §
1704(g) (emphasis added).
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order to state a cause of action and throw the burden of proof onto
the defendants. Not only would the potential liability run to a huge
class of plaintiffs-all persons who traded in any of the company's
securities during the currency of the annual report-but also the
Code formula for limiting liability is not severely restrictive because
of the large number of potential defendants. '"
The situation thus invokes Chief Judge Cardozo's fears of unrestricted liability for negligent representation," and would not conform to the Supreme Court's interpretation that Congress is imposing liability for negligent misrepresentation carefully limited the
situations to which liability was applicable. "0 The Supreme Court
has recognized that in this kind of litigation the dangers of the
litigation itself and the expenses thereof cause improvident settlements. 1 Indeed, the problem would be so serious that it might outweigh any benefits from the other provisions of the Code.
I certainly hope that the Institute withdraws from the present
position, and that Congress will then be influenced by the Institute's second and better thoughts.

IV.

THE POLICY ON CHANGING SUBSTANCE

As the Code approached completion, it became increasingly
apparent that the response to any proposal to change existing law
was, "The SEC won't go for it."6 To one who has in recent years
been less than an enthusiast for the SEC, 3 this deference was sometimes frustrating, but it represented a difficult policy choice.
In order to get a perspective on the problem, one must recognize
that, in its general work on improvement of the law, the ALI has
two basic choices. On one hand, in its Restatements of the Law, the
Institute is committed primarily to stating what it considers the
58. Potential defendants include the registrant, the principal executive officer or officers,
the principal accounting officer, every director, every prospective director named with his
consent in the report, and every expert who has filed his consent under § 2003(e) with the
report. FED. SEC, CODE § 1704(b). But see note 50 supra (shift of outside directors to § 1705).
59. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
60. See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
61. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737-49 (1975) (action
under rule 10b-5).
62. See Panel Discussion, Fourth Annual Baron de Hirsch Meyer Lecture Series, 33 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 1519, 1541 (1979).
63. See, e.g., Kripke, Where are We on Securities DisclosureAfter the Advisory Committee Report? 6 SEC. REG. L.J. 99 (1978) (also printed in 2 J. ACCOUNTING, AUDITING & FINANCE
4 (1978)); Kripke, Rule lOb-5 Liability and "Material' "Facts," 46 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1061
(1971); Kripke, The SEC, the Accountants, Some Myths and Some Realities, 45 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1151 (1970). See also H. KRIPKE, THE SEC AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE: REGULATION IN
SEARCH OF A PURPOSE (1979).
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present rule of law or, if conflicts exist among different jurisdictions,

the most sound position. It has some flexibility, however, and is not
,firmly bound to support the prevailing or majority view. "
On the other hand, when the ALI drafts a model statute, it
codifies a great deal of fragmentary and inconsistent statutory material and judicial development. Since it necessarily has to choose
from various rules which may have been inadequately conceptualized in their inception and to discern the unifying elements behind
inconsistent nomenclature, it is free to function much as a legislature, with reasonably complete latitude to decide what it thinks
should be the appropriate law. It took this approach in drafting and
revising the Uniform Commercial Code. 5
The question is: Which model should have been employed in
drafting the Federal Securities Code? The most closely analogous
prior experience of the ALI was its drafting of the Federal Income
Tax Statute, accomplished, no doubt, with the knowledge that the
Treasury, the Internal Revenue Service and the appropriate committees and other vocal members of Congress had their own strong
ideas. The whole process was constrained by the government's reluctance to agree to improvements in the law which could sharply
diminish the revenues. In this situation, therefore, the ALI chose to
go ahead with "a critical examination, overhauling and revision" of
the technical provisions of the then existing law,"" aware that its
proposal as a whole would not be adopted by Congress, but hopeful
that the draft would influence the government and congressional
legislation. The hope proved well-founded, and the ALI Federal
Income Tax Statute had substantial influence on the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
In the case of the Federal Securities Code, the choice was
64. As its Director has said:
It was, of course, no new departure in the Institute's conceptions to declare
that in our system of case law any statement that the law is such and such...
implies a normative assertion as to what should now be held, if and when the
question is presented . . . . To make the point explicit . . . permits the
Restatements to attempt to be what they have been and are in fact-a modest
but essential aid in the improved analysis, clarification, unification, growth and
adaptation of the common law.
Wechsler, The Course of the Restatements, 55 A.B.A. J. 147, 150 (1969).
65. See Kripke, The Principles Underlying the Drafting of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 1962 U. ILL. L.F. 321.
66. ALI FEDERAL INCOME TAX STATUTE, Introduction at ix (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1950). Its
current effort in the same field of law expressly asserts that the Institute ought not to encroach
on political questions such as the continuation both of the tax on corporate income and the
personal tax on dividends. Beyond that the draftsmen feel free to propose changes in law.

ALl

FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT SUBCHAPTER

C, Introduction (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1977).
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harder to make. Federal securities law is administered by the Securities and Exchange Commission, which is generally recognized as a
most vigorous, competent and aggressive federal agency, filled with
enthusiasm for its mission and jealous of its prerogatives. The Commission is supervised by congressional committees which, in recent
years, have been activist and which, to a great extent, have imposed
their own views upon the Commission in the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975.6 Thus, it was apparent that unless the ALI basically
accepted the present securities legislation and the SEC rules promulgated thereunder, it could never get the support of the SEC for
its proposal.' 8 Also, it seemed apparent from the inception of the
project that there could be no chance that this enormous Code could
be enacted, or even seriously considered, by Congress against the
determined opposition of the SEC."5
Thus, the question was whether to write a model statute which
might at some future time have some effect or to draft a Code for
current enactment within the constraint that it had to be generally
acceptable to the SEC. Professor Loss and those who planned the
enterprise with him chose the latter course. The drafters of the
Code, therefore, were constrained in a manner roughly comparable
to that of the Institute when drafting Restatements-they had to
restate existing laws with some judicious use of flexibility. Whether
the choice will prove to have been the most efficient one depends
on the course of future changes in securities law, a subject discussed
in the following section.
V.

THE MASSIVE CODIFICATION

The notion of a securities code which would go beyond the three
disclosure acts of 1933, 1934 and 1939 has the obvious advantages
which Professor Loss has repeatedly expounded.7" And now that the
67. Pub. Law No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (1975) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77-80).
68. See Garrett & Weaver, The Securities and Exchange Commission and the Code, 30
VAND. L. REv. 441, 445 (1977).
69. Congress, in recent years, has shown increasing concern about the SEC's performance. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C.A. § 102 (West Supp. 1979) [hereinafter
cited as Bankruptcy Reform Act], showed that certain changes in the law could be made in
the face of determined SEC opposition; however, those changes were made on points peripheral to the SEC's main mission. It may no longer be true that changes in basic securities
law cannot be enacted over SEC opposition, and it is possible that the Code will test the issue
in the favorable context of approval from the ALl and the ABA of the work of the distinguished Reporter.
70. See e.g., FED. SEC. CODE, Introductionat xv-xvii; Loss, The American Law Institute's
Federal Securities Code Project, 25 Bus. LAW. 27 (1969); Loss, supra note 45.'
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codification has been completed, I believe the work should be preserved by enactment. Nevertheless, even apart from the burdens of
sheer size, I perceive problems which stem from the concept of codification employed in the drafting process.
For instance, the Investment Company Act of 1940' is a poorly
drafted and badly patched statute which has been redrafted for the
Code. In the process, the drafters attempted to close numerous tiny
gaps in the regulation which were pointed out by the vigilant staff'
of the SEC.72 Yet now the Commission is setting up a task force to
relax the overpowering regulation,73 and the efforts of the drafters
may have been for naught. If the regulatory provisions do, in fact,
undergo substantial change, there will be a real test of the codification concept: Will the codification help the SEC in assimilating
substantially altered provisions; will it be merely neutral, or will it
provide a diversionary tactic for those who resist change? There may
be similar problems in the offing with respect to the codification of
the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 193511 and of the disclosure statutes. But, in considering those problems, as distinguished
from the situation with the 1940 Act, the SEC is more likely to lead
the movement resisting change. 5
I have not had occasion to use the Public Utility Holding Company Act since I left the staff of the Commission over a third of a
century ago. But even casual reading tells me that the Act is functus
officio with respect to its principal purposes of preventing abuses in,
and breaking up of, the public utility holding company systems of
the 1920's. It is also my impression that those provisions which
successfully fought the last war are not very relevant to the public
utility problems of today. If circumstances cause Congress to take
a fresh look at the substance of these provisions, there could be a
question raised as to the significance of the current codification.
My final question is along the same lines. In the last twentyfive years, other disciplines-economics, finance and account71. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-I to -52 (1976) [hereinafter cited as the 1940 Acti.
72. The staff furnished the draftsmen a memo containing many of the ideas published
in Rosenblatt & Lybecker, Some Thoughts on the FederalSecurities Laws Regulating External Investment Management Arrangements and the ALI FederalSecurities Code Project, 124
PA. L. REV. 587 (1976).
73. Karmel, A Skeptical Regulator Looks at the Future of Regulation, at 14 (Remarks
to the Women's Economic Club, Detroit, Nov. 20, 1978).
74. 15 U.S.C. §§ 79 to 79z-6 (1976).
75. The Commission stood alone in its resistance to rethinking of the reorganization
chapters of the Bankruptcy Act, although the National Bankruptcy Conference and the
National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges supported the bill, which became the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978.
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ing-have been responsible for a vast outpouring of learning and of
insights as to the operations of the securities markets. I have been
urging, thus far without success, that if securities lawyers paid attention to these contributions from other disciplines, the disclosure
laws would require rethinking on a fundamental level. ' " Others have
urged the application to securities regulation of insights from still
other social science disciplines, e.g., organization theory." This interdisciplinary approach was automatically precluded from consid7
eration when the ALI effort was conceived of as a codification. 1 If
those who urge the taking account of non-legal insights in the securities field ultimately prevail, we will again be presented with the
question of the significance of the codification of these forty yearold statutes.
When the pressure for fundamental revision arises, I hope that
Professor Loss' dream will prove to have been sound-that the codification will facilitate understanding of where we are, where we
should go and how to draft the changes. I would be content if the
effect of codification were merely neutral insofar as future change
is concerned; I would be deeply distressed if the codification lent
itself to use by those who resist fundamental change, by permitting
them the argument that the proposals had necessarily been considered and rejected by the Institute and Congress in the codification. 7"
It is clear to me that in these rapidly changing times, those who
undertake to codify statutes that are nearly two generations old
have an obligation to make clear whether and to what extent they
have gone beyond mere codification to consider the need for revision
of substance. Happily, my conversations with Professor Loss and
Professor Herbert Wechsler, Director of The American Law Institute, lead me to believe that they fully understand the point.
76. See Kripke, supra note 63, 6 SEC. REr,. L.J. at 99.
77. See Coffee, Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical View of Corporate
Misconduct and an Effective Legal Response, 63 VA. L. REV. 1099 (1977). Coffee suggests that
the modern corporation is characterized by inadequate flow of information and decentralization of authority which render the board of directors ineffective. He believes that activation
of an internal self-corrective system, rather than statutory regulation, is the better method
for achieving corporate reform.
78. Whether the ALI would be the appropriate sponsor for an interdisciplinary effort is
a question outside the scope of this paper.
79. Of course, such an argument would be legitimate in regard to changes made or
rejected on substantive grounds in drafting the Code, as discussed in Section II and Ill of this
article or as shown by the Reporter's Notes.
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CONCLUSION

If that point is made very clear, I believe that this massive
effort will prove very useful in pulling together securities law in its
existing condition, that it has important advantages in the changes
described in Section I, and that it should be enacted.

